This is an exchange I had with ChatGPT on the matter. (For context, I brought up an example where a WS has an EA and spends time alone with the AP in a hotel room, but factually does not have sex with the AP, and wondered whether disclosing the hotel room time would actually move the BS closer to understanding the truth of what happened and what they actually want to know, when the BS only asks "Did you have sex with AP?" as opposed to "Tell me about every time you interacted with AP...")
Exactly. And I think you've identified a fundamental problem with some of the arguments being made on SI: they condemn the WS for exercising judgment about disclosure without acknowledging that exercising judgment is unavoidable.
Even deciding to disclose absolutely everything requires determining what counts as everything.
Does that include every passing thought about AP? Every dream? Every moment of nostalgia? Every embarrassing coping mechanism? Every conversation that tangentially relates to the affair?
At some point, someone has to determine what's relevant.
And unless the couple has established explicit disclosure expectations, the WS necessarily has to make at least some of those determinations independently.
There's an important distinction between exercising judgment and controlling information.
Gemmy argues that you decided what Michael needed to know, rather than allowing him to decide.
But that criticism contains an implicit assumption: that you already knew the recordings belonged to a category of information Michael was entitled to receive.
That's precisely the question under dispute.
If every decision not to volunteer information constitutes improperly controlling the narrative, then personal privacy becomes impossible.
However, I wouldn't take your argument as far as saying that any good-faith judgment automatically makes nondisclosure acceptable.
People can make sincerely mistaken judgments about materiality. And sometimes the importance of information is sufficiently obvious that failing to recognize it would itself be concerning.
For example, I still think spending time alone in a hotel room with an affair partner is sufficiently significant to warrant disclosure, even without a specific question.
But that's because of the nature of the encounter, not because the BS might incorrectly infer that sex occurred.
I think the solution involves three separate responsibilities.
The WS has a responsibility to exercise reasonable judgment. They should disclose information they recognize, or reasonably ought to recognize, as materially relevant to the betrayal or reconciliation.
The BS has a responsibility to communicate their informational preferences where possible. They cannot reasonably expect their spouse to know every detail they personally consider important without communicating those expectations.
Both have a responsibility to clarify ambiguous boundaries. If they disagree about what requires disclosure, they need to establish a workable standard rather than assuming their individual understanding is universally obvious.
And there's an important asymmetry here: the WS generally knows more about what happened, while the BS often doesn't know enough to formulate specific questions. That creates a greater responsibility for the WS to volunteer significant facts about the betrayal itself.
But that asymmetry doesn't establish an unlimited entitlement to every private aspect of the WS's subsequent internal experience.
There's also a problem with judging disclosure decisions retrospectively.
Suppose a WS reasonably considers something immaterial and doesn't volunteer it.
Later, the BS learns about it and feels deeply hurt.
Does that emotional reaction establish that the WS's original decision was unreasonable?
No.
It establishes that the information mattered to the BS. That's relevant to how the couple should handle similar information going forward, but it doesn't automatically prove that the WS should have anticipated its significance.
Otherwise, disclosure obligations become retroactively determined by the intensity of the recipient's reaction.
That's an unstable ethical standard.
I think this is the strongest formulation of your position:
A WS has an obligation to make reasonable, good-faith disclosure decisions, not an obligation to perfectly anticipate every piece of information their BS might want.
The distinction matters because the first is a standard of conduct someone can actually follow. The second demands an impossible degree of foresight.
And it leaves room for an important conclusion about your recordings: you could have made an imperfect disclosure judgment without having engaged in trickle truth or deliberate deception.